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ATTACKING THE ENEMY CIVILIAN AS A
PUNISHABLE OFFENSE
WILLIAM J. FENRICK*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the bleak aftermath of World War II, a period in which many
doubted that limits could be imposed on war, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht
wrote:
[I]t is in [the] prohibition, which is a clear rule of law, of intentional
terrorization—or destruction—of the civilian population as an
avowed or obvious object of attack that lies the last vestige of the
claim that war can be legally regulated at all.  Without that irre-
ducible principle of restraint there is no limit to the licence and de-
pravity of force.1
Myres McDougal subsequently observed: “The essentially modest
character of this ‘absolute rule’ needs no underlining.”2
The modern law of war, now more frequently referred to as the
law of armed conflict or as international humanitarian law, prohibits
a range of activities related to attacks on civilian persons and objects.3
In general, however, the rules of this part of international humani-
tarian law are articulated at a high level of abstraction and generality.
Alleged violations are rarely investigated, let alone prosecuted.
It is, perhaps, for this reason that Edward Cody, deputy foreign
editor of the Washington Post, criticized the Office of the Prosecutor
(OTP) of  the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
* Senior Legal Advisor, Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia. These comments are made in a personal capacity and do not necessarily re-
flect the views of either the Office of the Prosecutor or the United Nations.
1. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 360, 369 (1952).
2. M.S. MCDOUGAL & F.P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR:
TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 80 (1994)
3. See generally Geoffrey Best, The Restraint of War in Historical and Philosophical Per-
spective, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 3 (Astrid Del-
lissen et al. eds., 1991).
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slavia (ICTY) for obtaining an indictment against Djordje Djukic, a
Bosnian Serb general, for the shelling of civilian targets in Sarajevo.4
Indeed, the OTP has obtained indictments directed against several
accused who are alleged to be responsible for international crimes
committed during combat.5  The charges against General Djukic, con-
tained in an indictment of February 29, 1996, indicate the approach of
the OTP to such offenses:
COUNTS 1 - 2
CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY
VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR
6. Djordje Djukic, in concert with others, planned, prepared or oth-
erwise aided and abetted in the planning and preparation of the
acts and operations of the Bosnian Serb army and its agents.  These
acts and operations included the following crimes:
SHELLING OF CIVILIAN TARGETS
7. From about May 1992 to about December 1995, in Sarajevo,
Bosnian Serb military forces, on a widespread and systematic basis,
deliberately or indiscriminately fired on civilian targets that were of
no military significance in order to kill, injure, terrorise and demor-
alise the civilian population of Sarajevo.
By these acts and omissions in relation to the shelling of civilian
targets in Sarajevo, Djordje Djukic committed:
COUNT 1:
a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, punishable under Article 5(i)
(inhumane acts) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
COUNT 2:
a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR,
punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal.6
It is probable that many of the cases that will be brought before
the ICTY will involve charges related to unlawful attacks on civilian
4. See E. Cody, Is It a War Crime or Just War?, WASH. POST, April 7, 1996, at C5; ICTY
Indictment, Prosecutor v. Djorde Djukic, Case No. IT-96-20-I (February 29, 1996).
5. See ICTY Indictment, Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-I (July 24, 1995)
(attacks on Zagreb in May 1995); ICTY Indictment, Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajic, Case No. IT-95-
12-I (August 23, 1995) (attacks on the village of Stupni Do on 23 October 1993); ICTY Indict-
ment, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic & Ratko Mladic, Case No. IT-95-5-I (July 24, 1995)
(attacks on civilians in Sarajevo in 1992 and 1995); ICTY Indictment, Prosecutor v. Radovan
Karadzic & Ratko Mladic, Case No. IT-95-18-I (November 16, 1995) (attacks on civilians in
Tuzla in 1995); ICTY Indictment, Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Others, Case No. IT-95-19-I
(November 10, 1995) (attacks on civilians in the Lasva Valley from January to May 1993).
6. Djukic, supra note 4, at 2-3.
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persons and objects.  This Comment explores some of the legal and
practical issues related to the prosecution of such cases.  Parts II and
III review the concept of the military objective and the principle of
proportionality, and Parts IV and V examine the existing treaty law
and the ICTY Statute.  Part VI identifies the preliminary legal issues,
and Part VII defines the elements of chargeable offenses and in-
cludes comments on how one might prove such elements.  Part VIII
examines a particular attack which led to civilian deaths, and Part IX
concludes the Comment.
II. THE CONCEPT OF THE MILITARY OBJECTIVE
International humanitarian law, including the law of the Hague
(the component of international law which regulates the conduct of
hostilities), can be reduced to a certain number of essential concepts
or principles.  Two of these essential principles are “the principle of
distinction”7 and “the principle of proportionality.”8  Central to the
principle of distinction is the concept of “the military objective,” or
the legitimate target.  If a viable body of law purporting to regulate
combat is to exist, a distinction must be drawn between persons or
objects which may be attacked and those which may not be attacked.
Since the eighteenth century, the range and potential destructive
power of weapons systems has increased enormously, but the capa-
bility of weapons systems to attack precise targets has varied over
time.  What is practicable has an impact on how military objectives
are perceived and defined.  For example, because aerial bombard-
ment was a relatively inaccurate means of attacking a small target
during most of World War II, air forces tended to engage in target
area bombardment rather than attacking precision targets.9  On the
other hand, in the last decade or two, at least where conventional
(i.e., non-nuclear) weapons are concerned, weapons systems with
precision guided munitions (PGMs) have been able to attain a higher
degree of accuracy.10
7. See generally Christopher Greenwood, Customary Law Status of the Protocols, in
HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 108 (Astrid Delissen et al.
eds., 1991).
8. See generally William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Con-
ventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91 (1982).
9. See 4 C. WEBSTER & N. FRANKLAND, THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST
GERMANY 1939-1945 at 205-13 (1961).
10. See Danielle L. Infeld, Precision-Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Ac-
curacy in Desert Storm; But is a Country Obligated to Use Precision Technology to Minimize
Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage?, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 109 (1992).
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A variety of attempts have been made to define the concept of
the military objective.11  The most widely accepted definition of mili-
11. See A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 27-46 (1996). In 1956, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) drew up the following proposed list of categories of
military objectives:
I. The objectives belonging to the following categories are those considered to be of
generally recognized military importance:
(1) Armed forces, including auxiliary or complementary organisations, and per-
sons who, though not belonging to the above-mentioned formations, nevertheless
take part in the fighting.
(2) Positions, installations or constructions occupied by the forces indicated in
sub-paragraph 1 above, as well as combat objectives (that is to say, those objec-
tives which are directly contested in battle between land or sea forces including
airborne forces).
(3) Installations, constructions and other works of a military nature, such as bar-
racks, fortifications, War Ministries (e.g. Ministries of Army, Navy, Air Force,
National Defence, Supply) and others organs for the direction and administration
of military operations.
(4) Stores of arms or military supplies, such as munition dumps, stores of equip-
ment or fuel, vehicles parks.
(5) Airfields, rocket launching ramps and naval base installations.
(6) Those of the lines and means of communications (railway lines, roads,
bridges, tunnels and canals) which are of fundamental military importance.
(7) The installations of broadcasting and television stations; telephone and tele-
graph exchanges of fundamental military importance.
(8) Industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the war:
(a) industries for the manufacture of armaments such as weapons, munitions,
rockets, armoured vehicles, military aircraft, fighting ships, including the
manufacture of accessories and all other war material;
(b) industries for the manufacture of supplies and material of a military
character, such as transport and communications material, equipment of the
armed forces;
(c) factories or plant constituting other production and manufacturing cen-
tres of fundamental importance for the conduct of war, such as the metallur-
gical, engineering and chemical industries, whose nature or purpose is essen-
tially military;
(d) storage and transport installations whose basic function it is to serve the
industries referred to in (a)-(c);
(e) installations providing energy mainly for national defence, e.g. coal, other
fuels, or atomic energy, and plants producing gas or electricity mainly for
military consumption.
(9) Installations constituting experimental, research centres for experiments on
and the development of weapons and war material.
II. The following however, are excepted from the foregoing list:
(1) Persons, constructions, installations or transports which are protected under
the Geneva Conventions I, II, III, of August 12, 1949;
(2) Non-combatants in the armed forces who obviously take no active or direct
part in hostilities.
III. The above list will be reviewed at intervals of not more than ten years by a group
of Experts composed of persons with a sound grasp of military strategy and of others
concerned with the protection of the civilian population.
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CON-
VENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 at 632-633 (Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmerman, eds.,
1987) (hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977).
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tary objective today is contained in Article 52 of Additional Protocol
I of 197712 (Protocol I), ratified by 143 states as of December 31, 1995,
including all of the states emerging on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia.  Article 52 states in part:
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or par-
tial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances rul-
ing at the time, offers a definite military advantage.13
Where objects are concerned, the definition has two elements: (a)
their nature, location, purpose or use must make an effective contri-
bution to military action, and (b) their total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization must offer a definite military advantage in
the circumstances ruling at the time.  Although this definition does
not refer to persons, in general, members of the armed forces are
considered combatants and thus have the right to participate directly
in hostilities.  As a corollary, combatants may also be attacked.  Us-
ing the Protocol I definition and his own review of state practice,
Major General A.P.V. Rogers, the British Director of Army Legal
Services has advanced a tentative list of military objectives:
military personnel and persons who take part in the fighting with-
out being members of the armed forces, military facilities, military
equipment, including military vehicles, weapons, munitions and
stores of fuel, military works, including defensive works and fortifi-
cations, military depots and establishments, including War and
Supply Ministries, works producing or developing military supplies
and other supplies of military value, including metallurgical, engi-
neering and chemical industries supporting the war effort; areas of
land of military significance such as hills, defiles and bridgeheads;
railways, ports, airfields, bridges, main roads as well as tunnels and
canals; oil and other power installations; communications installa-
tions, including broadcasting and television stations and telephone
and telegraph stations used for military communications.14
12. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16
I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].
13. Id. art. 52, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27, 16 I.L.M. at 1414.
14. Rogers, supra note 11, at 37 (citing M. BOTHE, ET AL., NEW RULES FOR THE VICTIMS
OF ARMIES CONFLICT 322 (Martinus Nijhoff ed., 1982)).
FENRICK FINAL MACRO 12/10/97  4:20 PM
544 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:539
The list was not intended to be exhaustive.15  It remains a require-
ment that both elements of the definition must be met before a target
can be properly considered an appropriate military objective.
The Protocol I definition of military objective has been criticized
by W. Hays Parks, the Special Assistant for Law of War Matters to
the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General as being focused too nar-
rowly on definite military advantage and paying too little heed to war
sustaining capability, including economic targets such as export in-
dustries.16  On the other hand, some critics of Coalition conduct in the
Gulf War have suggested that the Coalition air campaign, directed
admittedly against legitimate military objectives within the scope of
the Protocol I definition, caused excessive long-term damage to the
Iraqi economic infrastructure with a consequential adverse affect on
the civilian population.17  This criticism has not gone unchallenged.
Françoise Hampson has suggested a possible refinement of the defi-
nition:
In order to determine whether there is a real subject of concern
here, it would be necessary to establish exactly what the effect has
been of the damage to the civilian infrastructure brought about by
the hostilities.  If that points to a need further to refine the law, it is
submitted that what is needed is a qualification to the definition of
military objectives.  Either it should require the likely cumulative
effect on the civilian population of attacks against such targets to be
taken into account, or the same result might be achieved by re-
quiring that the destruction of the object offer a definite military
advantage in the context of the war aim.18
Although the Protocol I definition of military objective is not
beyond criticism, it provides the contemporary standard which must
be used when attempting to determine the lawfulness of particular
attacks.
15. See id. at 37.
16. W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 135-45 (1990).
17. See generally MIDDLE EAST WATCH, NEEDLESS DEATHS IN THE GULF WAR: CI-
VILIAN CASUALTIES DURING THE AIR CAMPAIGN AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR
(1991); Judith G. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L.
391, 404-10 (1993).
18. Françoise Hampson, Means and Methods of Warfare in the Conflict in the Gulf, in THE
GULF WAR 1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW 89, 100 (P. Rowe ed., 1993).
FENRICK FINAL MACRO 12/10/97  4:20 PM
1997] ATTACKING THE ENEMY CIVILIAN 545
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
An undue focus on the principle of the military objective might
lead one to ignore civilian casualties or regard them as an unfortu-
nate accident occurring in the course of legitimate military activities.
The principle of proportionality counters this tendency by requiring a
constant weighing of military and humanitarian values.  There is,
however, a debate concerning the very existence of the principle of
proportionality in customary law.19  It is this author’s view that that
debate is pointless as, whether or not proportionality is formally em-
bedded in customary law, it is a logically necessary part of any deci-
sion-making process which attempts to reconcile humanitarian im-
peratives and military requirements during armed conflict.  Although
the term “proportionality” is not used in Protocol I, equivalent terms
such as “excessive damage” or “excessive injury” are used in Article
51(5)(b),20 Article 57(2)(b),21 and Article 85(3).22  The principle of
proportionality clearly does bind parties to the Protocol, including
the successor states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.23
The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not
whether or not it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied.
It is relatively simple to state that there must be an acceptable rela-
tion between the legitimate destructive effect and undesirable collat-
eral effects.  For example, bombing a refugee camp is obviously pro-
hibited if its only military significance is that women in the camp are
knitting socks for soldiers.  Conversely, an air strike on an ammuni-
tion dump should not be prohibited merely because a farmer is
plowing a field in the area.  Unfortunately, most applications of the
principle of proportionality are not quite so clear cut.  It is much
easier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general terms
than it is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances because the
19. See Parks, supra note 16, at 168-202; Fenrick, supra note 8, at 91-127.
20. Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51(5)(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.
21. Id. art. 57(2)(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29, 16 I.L.M. at 1416.
22. Id. art. 85(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 42, 16 I.L.M. at 1428.
23. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) ratified the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions in 1950 and the two Additional Protocols in 1979.  The Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via has acknowledged it is bound by these agreements as a successor state.  Croatia deposited a
declaration of succession to the Conventions and Protocols on May 11, 1992 and, because of
previous ratification by the SFRY, these instruments came into force for Croatia retroactively
on October 8, 1991, the date of Croatian independence.  Bosnia-Herzegovina deposited a dec-
laration of succession to the Conventions and Protocols on December 31, 1992 and, because of
previous ratification by the SFRY, these instruments came into force retroactively on March 6,
1992, the date of Bosnian independence.
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comparison is often between unlike quantities and values.  How do
you assess the value of innocent human lives as opposed to capturing
a particular military objective?
The questions which remain unresolved once one decides to ap-
ply the principle of proportionality include the following:
1) What are the relative values to be assigned to the military advan-
tage gained and the injury to non-combatants and or the damage to
civilian objects?
2) What do you include or exclude in totalling your sums?
3) What is the standard of measurement in time or space? and
4) To what extent is a military commander obligated to expose his
own forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or damage
to civilian objects?
The answers to these questions are not simple.  It may be necessary
to resolve them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ
depending on the background and values of the decision maker.  It is
unlikely that a human rights lawyer and an experienced combat
commander would assign the same relative values to military advan-
tage and to injury to noncombatants.  Further, it is unlikely that mili-
tary commanders with different doctrinal backgrounds and differing
degrees of combat experience or national military histories would al-
ways agree in close cases.  I suggest that the determination of relative
values must be that of the “reasonable military commander.”  Al-
though there will be room for argument in close cases, there will be
many cases where reasonable military commanders will agree that
the injury to noncombatants or the damage to civilian objects was
clearly disproportionate to the military advantage gained.
Collateral casualties to civilians and collateral damage to civilian
objects can occur for a variety of reasons.  Despite an obligation to
avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated
areas, to remove civilians from the vicinity of military objectives, and
to protect their civilians from the dangers of military operations,24
very little prevention may be feasible in many cases.  City planners
rarely pay heed to the possibility of future warfare.  Military objec-
tives are located in densely populated areas and fighting occasionally
occurs in such areas.  W. Hays Parks listed causes of collateral casual-
ties during the air bombardment campaigns of World War II as fol-
24. See Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51(7), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.
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lows:
Where collateral civilian casualties occurred, they could be attrib-
uted to myriad factors, not the least of which was the intensity of
enemy defenses.  Other factors included weather, enemy deception,
dispersal of targets, and their commingling with the civilian popula-
tion as a natural consequence of industrialization and urban
growth.25
Even with a substantial improvement in weapon accuracy since
World War II, actually hitting a target remains a difficult task.  In an-
other comment, W. Hays Parks has observed:
Despite the development of sophisticated computer systems, many
variables influence the accuracy equation.  With conven-
tional . . . munitions, one combat-experienced pilot has noted that
bombing remains an inherently inaccurate process . . . Aiming er-
rors, boresight errors, system computational errors all act to de-
grade the system.  Unknown winds at altitudes below the release
point and the ‘combat degradation’ factor add more errors to the
process.  In short, it is impossible to hit a small target except by
sheer luck . . . .26
Parks appears to be inclined to assign a degree of responsibility
for collateral casualties to the state which has left its civilians near
military objectives rather than to assign total responsibility to the at-
tacking force.  Some of his observations are quite incisive.  For ex-
ample, if civilians are killed because attacking aircraft are shot down
or because antiaircraft shells or missiles hit civilians when they return
to earth, why should the attacking air force be blamed?  It is sug-
gested that that the attacking force must consider all civilian casual-
ties and damage to civilian objects caused by its forces but not the
collateral casualties or damage caused by responding defense forces.
Determining the proper standard of measurement in time or
space (geographic extent) for applying the proportionality equation is
also difficult.  As a baseline, any deliberate attack on civilian persons
or objects, occurring at any time, is unlawful, even if it is perceived as
25. Parks, supra note 16, at 55.
26. W. Hays Parks, Conventional Aerial Bombing and the Law of War, United States Na-
val Institute Proceedings, 1983 Naval Review Issue 98, 112.
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conferring a military advantage.27  Further, the standard of measure-
ment must be one which is practicable to use in advance of an attack
to determine whether the proportionality requirement is being met at
various stages in the conflict.  One cannot, for example, assert that it
will only be possible to determine whether or not military activity
complied with the proportionality principle at the end of the war or a
lengthy campaign.  At the same time, one cannot always assess pro-
portionality on a bullet by bullet basis or even on the basis of discrete
military objectives.  The remarks of Louise Doswald-Beck, a senior
legal adviser with the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), are particularly relevant:
It should also be noted that the principle of proportionality is being
interpreted by some States as applying to the effects of a particular
attack as a whole, rather than solely in relation to the incidental
damage around one object.  Thus the United Kingdom on signing
the Protocol, and Netherlands and Italy on ratification, stated that:
in relation to paragraph 5(b) of Article 51 and paragraph
2(a)(iii) of Article 57, . . . the military advantage anticipated
from the attack is intended to refer to the advantage antici-
pated from the attack as a whole and not only from isolated or
particular parts of the attack.
This approach should be acceptable if seen within the context of a
given tactical operation: such an operation may necessitate, for ex-
ample, the destruction of six military objectives, one of which, be-
ing particularly difficult to get at, might involve far greater casual-
ties than the other five.  The attack of that one objective on its own
might be of no great use, but within the context of the operation as
a whole, absolutely essential.  The yardstick, in this example, would
be the number of casualties overall in relation to the value of the
operation as a whole.28
Determining the extent to which a military commander is obli-
gated to expose his own forces to danger in order to limit civilian
casualties or damage to civilian objects is almost impossible.  Strictly
speaking, resolution of the proportionality equation requires a de-
termination of the relative worths of military advantage gained by
27. See Hans-Peter Gasser, Negotiating the Protocols: Was It a Waste of Time?, in
HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 82 (Astrid Dellissen et al.
eds., 1991).
28. L. Doswald-Beck, The Value of the 1977 Geneva Protocols for the Protection of Civil-
ians, reprinted in ARMED CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW: ASPECTS OF THE 1977 GENEVA
PROTOCOLS AND THE 1981 WEAPONS CONVENTION 137, 156-7 (Michael A. Meyer ed., 1989).
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one side and the civilian casualties or damage to civilian objectives
incurred in areas in the hands of the other side.29  Military casualties
incurred by the attacking side are not a part of the equation.  A will-
ingness to accept some own-side casualties in order to limit civilian
casualties may indicate a greater desire to ensure compliance with the
principle of proportionality.  Military commanders do, however, also
have a duty to limit casualties to their own forces.
IV. EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The treaties applicable in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
and relevant to the issue of attacking the enemy as a punishable of-
fense are the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land30 and the two 1977 Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.31  Article 25 of the Rules Annexed to 1907
Hague Convention (IV) states: “The attack or bombardment, by
whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are
undefended is prohibited.”
This provision has a very limited scope of applicability.  In the
words of the British manual The Law of War on Land drafted by Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht:
290. An undefended or “open” town is a town which is so com-
pletely undefended from within or without that the enemy may en-
ter and take possession of it without fighting or incurring casualties.
It follows that no town behind the immediate front line can be open
or undefended for the attacker must fight his way to it.  Any town
behind the enemy front line is thus a defended town and is open to
ground or other bombardment, subject to the limitations imposed
on all bombardments, namely, that as far as possible, the latter
must be limited to military objectives.32
29. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 520-28 (H. Lauterpacht,
LL.D ed., 7th ed. 1952) (discussing the susceptibility of non-combatants to aerial bombard-
ment).
30. See Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
205 Consol. T.S. 277, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: A COLLECTION OF
CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 57-92 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri To-
man eds., 2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter Schindler & Toman].
31. See Protocol I, supra note 12; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II].
32. THE WAR OFFICE, THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND BEING PART III OF THE MANUAL OF
MILITARY LAW 97 (1958).
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Although there have been allegations of attacks on open towns in the
past,33 such allegations do not appear to have formed the basis for
criminal charges.  As an enemy by definition may take possession of
an undefended town without fighting, there would seem to be no
military purpose to the bombardment of such a place.  In addition to
the Hague Convention provisions, the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg listed “wanton destruction of cities,
towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity” as
a war crime.34  The Control Council, an Allied Powers entity which
“ruled” Germany after German surrender in 1945, contained a simi-
lar provision in Control Council Law No. 10 which was used as the
basis for further war crimes trials.35  Although this provision would
appear to encompass offenses committed by attacking forces, it does
not appear to have been used for this purpose.  The leading case con-
cerning this provision is the trial of General Rendulic, one of the co-
accused in the Hostages Trial, addressing the destruction of property
in areas under his control.36  At Nuremberg in the trial of Hermann
Goering, the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, it was expected
that the International Military Tribunal would make some reference
to the wanton destruction of cities in the conduct of air warfare that
he ordered.  This reference was not made, most likely because the
Allies had also engaged in such extensive destruction of German cit-
ies by air bombardment.37  Indeed, in the words of George Brand, the
editor of the Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, “No records of
trial concerning the illegal conduct of air warfare were ever brought
to the notice of the United Nations War Crimes Commission.”38
Protocol I is a substantial modernization of the law for interna-
tional conflict, particularly of the law concerning conduct of hostili-
ties.  Article 51 contains a number of specific rules requiring protec-
tion of the civilian population, including prohibition of
33. See, e.g., 1 JAMES WILFORD GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR
417-33 (1920).
34. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 30, at 826.
35. See Control Council Law No. 10, reprinted in HOWARD S. LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR:
THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 558-62 (1993).
36. See The Hostages Trial, 8 LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 34, 69 (1948).
37. See THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 492
(1948).
38. G. Brand, The War Crimes Trials and the Law of War, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 414, 419
(1949).
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“indiscriminate attacks,” “reprisals,” and the use of civilians to
“render certain points or areas immune from military operations.”39
Article 57 establishes the procedures by which the standards set
forth in Article 51 are to be accomplished, including a requirement
that those who plan an attack “do everything feasible to verify that
the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects”
and “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods
of attack with a view to avoiding . . . incidental loss of civilian life.”40
Article 85 addresses repression of breaches of the Protocol and
states that “grave breaches” include “making the civilian population
or individual civilians the object of attack,” or “launching an indis-
39. Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.  The text
reads, in part:
Article 51 - Protection of the civilian population
. . .
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited . . . .
6. Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohib-
ited.
7. The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall
not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in par-
ticular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or im-
pede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of
the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield militia ob-
jectives from attacks or to shield military operations.
40. Id. art. 57, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29, 16 I.L.M. at 1416.  The text reads:
Article 57 - Precautions in attack
1. In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the ci-
vilian population, civilians and civilian objects.
2. With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
(a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are nei-
ther civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but
are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and
that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them;
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of at-
tack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the ob-
jective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, dam-
age to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in re-
lation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;
(c) effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the ci-
vilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.
3. When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar
military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may
be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.
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criminate attack” which is expected to cause serious injury or loss of
life.41
Additional Protocol II of 1977 (Protocol II), which is concerned
with internal conflicts, does not contain a provision related to repres-
sion of breaches, and its provision concerning protection of the civil-
ian population is much less detailed:
Article 13 - Protection of the civilian population
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy gen-
eral protection against the dangers arising from military operations.
To give effect to this protection, the following rules shall be ob-
served in all circumstances.
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians,
shall not be the object of attack.  Acts or threats of violence the
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population are prohibited.
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part, unless
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.42
Although it has not been done in the past, it is technically possi-
ble to identify some attacks on the enemy as “crimes against human-
ity.”  In the Nuremberg Charter, crimes against humanity were enu-
merated as follows:
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, en-
slavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or perse-
cutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country
where perpetrated.43
41. Id. art. 85, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 41, 16 I.L.M. at 1427.  The text reads:
Article 85 - Repression of breaches of this Protocol
. . .
3. [T]he following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when
committed wilfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing
death or serious injury to body or health:
(a) making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack;
(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian
objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2(a)
(iii).
42. Protocol II, supra note 31, art. 13, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615, 16 I.L.M. at 1447.
43. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
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Control Council Law No. 10 contained a somewhat similar list, but
one which did not link the offenses with the war:
(c) Crimes against Humanity.  Atrocities and offences, including
but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deporta-
tion, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts commit-
ted against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, ra-
cial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic
laws of the country where perpetrated.44
The concept of crime against humanity emerged to criminalize the
conduct of those who committed large scale atrocities directed
against civilian populations, including the populations of the perpe-
trator.45  For example, the German attempt to exterminate German
Jews would not constitute a war crime but it was a crime against hu-
manity.  There is no treaty law definition of crimes against humanity.
V. THE ICTY STATUTE
The prohibitions listed above will serve as the basis for prosecu-
tion of cases in the ICTY.  Articles 2-5 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Tribunal (Tribunal Statute)46 list crimes to be prosecuted and
refer to the pre-existing legal framework. Article 3 of the Statute
states:
Article 3
Violations of the laws or customs of war
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute per-
sons violating the laws or customs of war.  Such violations shall in-
clude, but not be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons cal-
culated to cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devasta-
tion not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of unde-
fended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions
                                                                                                                                     
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 30, at 826.
44. Control Council Law No. 10, reprinted in HOWARD S. LEVIE, supra note 35.
45. See Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 178 (1946).
46. See Statute of the International Tribunal, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Tribunal Statute].
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dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sci-
ences, historic monuments and works of art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.47
In its decision on jurisdiction in the Tadic case,48 the ICTY Appeals
Chamber held as follows:
91. Article 3 thus confers on the International Tribunal jurisdiction
over any serious offence against international humanitarian law not
covered by Article 2, 4 or 5.  Article 3 is a fundamental provision
laying down that any “serious violation of international humani-
tarian law” must be prosecuted by the International Tribunal.  In
other words, Article 3 functions as a residual clause designed to en-
sure that no serious violation of international humanitarian law is
taken away from the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal.  Ar-
ticle 3 aims to make such jurisdiction watertight and inescapable.49
At a later point in the same decision, the Appeals Chamber similarly
stated:
143. It follows that the International Tribunal is authorised to ap-
ply, in addition to customary international law, any treaty which: (i)
was unquestionably binding on the parties at the time of the alleged
offence; and (ii) was not in conflict with or derogated from peremp-
tory norms of international law, as are most customary rules of in-
ternational humanitarian law.50
Because both Protocol I and II were in force in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia throughout the conflict and are not covered by
Articles 2, 4, or 5 of the Statute, violations of the Protocols may be
prosecuted under Article 3 of the Statute.
The Appeals Chamber also provided a relatively elaborate dis-
cussion of the current content of customary law for all conflicts.51  In
the course of this discussion, it concluded that the principles in U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 2444 of December 19, 196852 and U.N.
47. Id. art. 3.
48. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32
(1996) [hereinafter Tadic].
49. Id. at 51 (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 74.
51. See id. at 55-68.
52. G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
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General Assembly Resolution 2675 of December 9, 197053 applied to
all conflicts.54  By implication, violations of these principles may also
be charged as offences under Article 3 of the Statute.  Resolution
2675 provides in part:
5. Dwellings and other installations that are used only by civilian
populations should not be the object of military operations . . . .
7. Civilian populations, or individual members thereof, should not
be the object of reprisals . . . .55
It is also possible to use Article 5 of the ICTY Statute in connection
with unlawful attacks:
Article 5
Crimes against humanity
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute per-
sons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed
conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed
against any civilian population:
(a)murder; . . .
(i)other inhumane acts.56
VI. PRELIMINARY LEGAL ISSUES
A few preliminary legal issues must be addressed before deter-
mining when certain ways of attacking the enemy should be regarded
as a punishable offense.  First, the Geneva Conventions and Protocol
I identify certain offenses as “grave breaches” and obligate all states
party to enact legislation to provide effective penal sanctions for per-
sons committing or ordering the commission of grave breaches, and
to search for such persons and bring them before their courts for
trial.57  Further, Article 85 of Protocol I specifically indicates that all
53. G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
54. See Tadic, supra note 48, at 59-61.
55. G.A. Res. 2675, supra note 53.
56. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 46, art. 5.
57. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49-50, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3146, 75 U.N.T.S.
31, 62 [hereinafter Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50-51, 6 U.S.T.,
3217, 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116 [hereinafter Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to
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grave breaches are war crimes.58
There is no grave breach provision in Protocol II, nor do the
grave breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply to internal
conflicts.   For breaches of the Geneva Conventions and of Protocol I
other than grave breaches, all parties are obliged to take measures
necessary for their suppression,59 but neither Common Article 3 nor
Protocol II obligate parties to the treaties to suppress breaches.
Treaties negotiated prior to 1945 do not address the issue of individ-
ual criminal responsibility.
The post-World War II war crimes tribunals, however, had no
difficulty assigning individual criminal responsibility for breaches of
such laws.  In particular, the Nuremberg Tribunal held that “crimes
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract enti-
ties, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced.”60  The Appeals
Chamber, in the Tadic jurisdictional decision,61 relied on the ap-
proach adopted by the Nuremberg Tribunal and disregarded a poten-
tial argument that the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Protocols I and
II, and other treaties such as the Conventional Weapons Convention
of 1981,62 clearly distinguished between activities which might result
in individual criminal liability and other activities for which states but
not individuals might be held responsible.  In the view of the Appeals
Chamber, the grave breach system was intended to identify certain
particularly serious offenses for which universal mandatory jurisdic-
tion was applicable.63  Other violations of treaty or customary law ap-
plicable in international or internal armed conflict would also attract
                                                                                                                                     
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 129-30, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3418-20, 75
U.N.T.S. 136, 236-38 [hereinafter Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146-7, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3616-18, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 386-88 [hereinafter Convention IV]; Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 11, 1125
U.N.T.S. at 11, 16 I.L.M. at 1400; Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 85, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 41, 16
I.L.M. at 1427.
58. See Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 85, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 41, 16 I.L.M. at 1427.
59. See Convention I, supra note 57, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62; Conven-
tion II, supra note 57, art. 50, at 6 U.S.T. at 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; Convention III, supra note
57, art. 129, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236; Convention IV, supra note 57, art. 146, 6
U.S.T. at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at 386; Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 85.
60. 22 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE  MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 466 (1948).
61. See Tadic, supra note 48, at 32.
62. United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of the Use of Certain Con-
ventional Weapons: Final Act, Oct. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/15 (1980), reprinted in 19
I.L.M. 1523 (1980).
63. See Tadic, supra note 48, at 59.
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individual criminal liability on the basis of the universality principle.64
For the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICTY, the Appeals Chamber
was of the view that the violation must be “serious” and it discussed
this expression as follows:
94 . . . (iii)the violation must be “serious”, that is to say, it must
constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values, and the
breach must involve grave consequences for the victim.  Thus, for
instance, the fact of a combatant simply appropriating a loaf of
bread in an occupied village would not amount to a “serious viola-
tion of international humanitarian law” although it may be re-
garded as falling foul of the basic principle laid down in Article 46,
paragraph 1, of the Hague Regulations (and the corresponding rule
of customary international law) whereby “private property must be
respected” by any army occupying an enemy territory . . . .65
Under the law applicable in World War II and earlier, siege war-
fare constituted a form of lex specialis.  A besieging force could law-
fully cut off water and food supplies to starve a town into submission,
fire on civilians attempting to leave, and bombard both private and
public areas within the besieged location.66   I suggest the lex specialis
of siege warfare has been effectively abolished.  Under the treaty law
applicable to international conflict, (1) attacking civilians is prohib-
ited (Arts. 51 and 85 of Protocol I), (2) attacking civilian objects is
prohibited (Art. 52 of Protocol I), (3) starving civilians as a method
of warfare is prohibited (Art. 54 of Protocol I); and (4) a qualified
right to send relief supplies exists (Art. 70 of Protocol I).
Under the treaty law applicable to internal conflicts, (1) attack-
ing civilians is prohibited (Art. 13 of Protocol II); (2) starving civil-
ians as a method of warfare is prohibited (Art. 14 of Protocol II); and
(3) a qualified right to send relief supplies exists (Art. 18 of Protocol
II).
Further, as indicated earlier, in the view of the Appeals Cham-
ber in the Tadic Jurisdiction motion, attacks on civilian objects are
prohibited as a matter of customary law in all conflicts, and this pro-
hibition is reflected in U.N. Resolution 2675 of December 9, 1970.67
The viability of the starvation provisions in the Protocols in a siege
64. See id. at 70-71.
65. Id. at 62.
66. See 2 H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 417-419 (7th ed., 1952).
67. See G.A. Res. 2675, supra note 53.
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warfare context has, however, been attacked by at least one writer.68
A potential defense plea to a charge of conducting an unlawful
attack is an argument that the accused was taking such action as a re-
prisal.  A reprisal is a crude law enforcement device.  It is an illegal
act resorted to after the adverse party has himself indulged in illegal
acts and refused to desist therefrom after being called upon to do so.69
The reprisal is not just a retaliatory act or a simple act of vengeance,
but should be roughly proportionate to the original wrongdoing, and
must be terminated once the original wrongdoer ceases his illegal ac-
tions.70  The proportionality is not strict, for, if the reprisal is to be ef-
fective, it will often be greater than the original wrongdoing.71  Never-
theless, there must be a reasonable relationship between the original
wrong and the reprisal measure.72
In international conflicts, reprisals are prohibited against civil-
ians and civilian objects.73  The treaty law of internal conflicts does
not address the reprisal issue.  U.N. Resolution 2675 indicates repri-
sals against civilians are prohibited in all circumstances.74  This issue
was litigated in the Rule 61 proceeding concerning Milan Martic in
an ex parte proceeding held before one of the ICTY trial chambers in
February 1996.75  The prosecution argued that the chamber should
decide that reprisals against civilians were prohibited in all conflicts,
including internal conflicts, because (1) an explicit prohibition al-
ready existed in treaties applicable to international conflict, (2) U.N.
68. See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Siege Warfare and the Starvation of Civilians, in HU-
MANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 145-52 (A.M. Delissen et al.
eds., 1991).
69. The standard text on reprisals is F. KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (1971).
See also A.R. Albrecht, War Reprisals in the War Crimes Trials and in the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 590, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. (1950); D. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force
1, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. (1972); M. Bristol, The Laws of War and Belligerent Reprisals against En-
emy Civilian Populations 397, 21 A.F. L. REV. (1979).
70. See Albrecht, supra note 69, at 590.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Protocol I, supra note 12, arts. 51(6), 52(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26-27, 16 I.L.M. at
1413-14.
74. See G.A. Res. 2675, supra note 53.
75. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola-
tions of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.9 (1996).  Rule 61 addresses
the procedure to be followed in case of failure to execute a warrant, and provides for an ex
parte proceeding before one of the trial chambers during which the prosecutor presents some
of the evidence in the case and attempts to have the indictment reconfirmed. As there is no
finding of guilt or innocence, it is not a trial in absentia.
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Resolution 2675 reflects the state of customary law for all conflicts;
(3) Article 4 of Protocol II requiring protection of civilians “in all cir-
cumstances” implicitly prohibits reprisals; and (4) reprisals are an in-
effective means of law enforcement.76   The trial chamber agreed:
17. Therefore, the rule which states that reprisals against the civil-
ian population as such, or individual civilians, are prohibited in all
circumstances, even when confronted by wrongful behaviour of the
other party, is an integral part of customary international law and
must be respected in all armed conflicts.77
VII. CHARGEABLE OFFENCES
The existing international legal prohibitions must be prosecuted
in terms of the charges listed in Articles 2-5 of the ICTY Statute.
The available charges related to attacks on civilian persons or objects
under Article 3, “Violations of Laws or Customs of War”, of the
Statute appear to be deliberate attacks, indiscriminate attacks,
spreading terror and, perhaps, wanton destruction.  Potential charges
under Article 5, “Crimes Against Humanity”, are murder and other
inhumane acts.
The relevant treaty provisions concerning deliberate attacks are
the following: Article 51(2) of Protocol I prohibiting direct attacks on
civilian populations and individual civilians;78 Article 52(1) of Proto-
col I prohibiting direct attacks on civilian objects;79 Article 85(3) of
Protocol I holding direct attacks on the civilian population or indi-
vidual civilians to constitute a grave breach when committed wilfully
and causing death or serious injury to body or health;80 and Article
13(2) of Protocol II prohibiting direct attacks on the civilian popula-
tion or individual civilians in internal conflict.81  It would appear that
direct attacks on civilian objects would also constitute a violation of
customary law in all conflicts.
In order to minimize the impact of the conflict classification is-
sue—international or internal—on cases before the ICTY, it would
76. Brief on the Applicable Law for Rule 61 Hearing, Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Case
No. IT-95-11-I (1996).
77. Decision of Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-I (1996).
78. Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.
79. Id. art. 52(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27, 16 I.L.M. at 1414.
80. Id. art. 85(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 42, 16 I.L.M. at 1428.
81. Protocol II, supra note 31, art. 13(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615, 16 I.L.M. at 1447.
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be appropriate to charge for violations of the laws or customs of war
(attacks on civilian persons or objects), as such an offense can be
committed in both international and internal conflicts.  Although a
direct attack on civilians can consist of a single soldier firing a single
bullet, it is probable that cases before the ICTY would involve higher
level decision makers and multiple incidents, or at least multiple
projectiles.  Appropriate elements for a charge against one who plans
or decides upon an attack might include the following: (1) the ac-
cused planned or decided upon the attack; (2) the attack was
launched wilfully; and (3) the attack constituted a deliberate attack
on civilians or civilian objects.
Concerning the mental element for the offenses, Protocol I im-
poses obligations on those who plan an attack to gather and assess in-
telligence concerning the location to be attacked and to verify that it
is in fact a military objective, to take all feasible precautions to avoid
or minimize collateral civilian casualties or damage to civilian ob-
jects, and to refrain from or cancel attacks which may be expected to
cause disproportionate civilian casualties or damage to civilian ob-
jects.82  It is reasonable to impose these same obligations on those
who plan attacks in internal conflicts as well.  Those who plan an at-
tack would wilfully launch a deliberate attack on civilians or civilian
objects if they were aware of the presence of civilians or civilian ob-
jects and intentionally attacked them or if they recklessly failed to
have such information gathered.  If good faith efforts are made to
gather information but the available information is wrong, no crimi-
nal liability should be assigned.  The American attack on an air raid
shelter during the Gulf War would appear to have been a mistake,
not a crime.83
Whether or not an attack would constitute a deliberate attack on
civilians or civilian objects would be a question of fact.  Civilian casu-
alties, civilian property damage, and the absence of military objec-
tives or of significant military objectives in the area attacked would
be of prime importance.
Indiscriminate attacks are partially defined and absolutely pro-
hibited in Protocol I Articles 51(4) and (5):
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.  Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
82. Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 57, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29, 16 I.L.M. at 1416.
83. See Hampson, supra note 18, at 96-97.
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(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which
cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the ef-
fects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without dis-
tinction.
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be consid-
ered as indiscriminate:
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly sepa-
rated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town,
village, or other area containing a similar concentration of ci-
vilians or civilian objects; and
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.84
There is no mention of indiscriminate attacks in Protocol II.  In-
discriminate attacks which are tantamount to deliberate attacks may
be charged as such.  Assuming civilian casualties are caused, indis-
criminate attacks within the meaning of Article 51(4) of Protocol I
would probably always also constitute a deliberate attack on civilians.
For example, German V1 and V2 missile attacks during the World
War II and Iraqi Scud missile attacks during the Gulf War could be
regarded as deliberate attacks on civilians even though a few of the
missiles fell on military objectives.  Whether or not an indiscriminate
attack within the meaning of Article 51(5)(b) would also constitute a
deliberate attack on the civilian population would depend on the re-
sults of the proportionality equation: Causing disproportionate col-
lateral civilian casualties or damage could be regarded as equivalent
to a direct attack.
Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited by both
Art. 51(2) of Protocol I and Art. 13(2) of Protocol II.  The dictionary
defines terror as “extreme fear,” but many lawful acts in armed con-
flict cause extreme fear.  The prohibition must, therefore, refer to
unlawful acts or unlawful threats of violence, the primary purpose of
which is to spread extreme fear among the civilian population.
84. Protocol I, supra note 12, arts. 51(4)-(5), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.
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Threats to wipe out a city or to exterminate its population would be
clear examples of prohibited threats.  Whether or not unlawful acts
do in fact spread terror among the civilian population can be deter-
mined by psychological evidence.  Whether or not the primary pur-
pose of unlawful acts is to spread terror can be inferred from the cir-
cumstances.  For example, conducting cat-and-mouse sniping against
the civilians of a besieged city whereby some civilians would be at-
tacked on a random basis and all civilians would be in a constant state
of extreme fear would appear to be an example of a deliberate at-
tempt to spread terror.
Article 3(b) of the ICTY Statute prohibits “wanton destruction
of cities, towns or villages or devastation not justified by military ne-
cessity.”85  It is derived from Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter86
and it does not appear to have been used in the past for charges in-
volving attacks against the enemy.  Bearing its origins in mind, it is
debatable whether the offense is confined to international conflicts or
also applies to internal conflicts.  As protection of the same interests
can be achieved by focusing on breaches of contemporary instru-
ments such as the Additional Protocols, and as Protocol II does apply
to internal conflicts, the utility of a charge based on this provision is
debatable.
It is also practicable to prosecute certain attacks against the en-
emy as crimes against humanity contrary to Article 5 of the Statute.
The Report of the Secretary General discussing the ICTY Statute
states in part that “crimes against humanity refer to inhumane acts of
a very serious nature, such as wilful killing, torture or rape, commit-
ted as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.”87
Although there is no precedent for crimes against humanity
charges related to attacks against the enemy, there would not appear
to be any conceptual barrier against using such charges in appropri-
ate circumstances.  The most appropriate charges would appear to be
under Article 5(a) for attacks where death occurs and under Article
5(i) for other injuries including mental suffering.88  It is essential to
establish that the prohibited acts were committed as part of a wide-
spread or systematic attack against a civilian population.
85. Tribunal Statute, supra note 46, at 37.
86. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, supra note 34, at 826.
87. Tribunal Statute, supra note 46, at 13.
88. See id. at 38.
FENRICK FINAL MACRO 12/10/97  4:20 PM
1997] ATTACKING THE ENEMY CIVILIAN 563
VIII. PROVING OFFENSES
The ICTY Statute adopts current customary law, particularly in
Article 7 concerning individual criminal responsibility, which states in
part:
Article 7
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or other-
wise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of
a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be
individually responsible for the crime.
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve
his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had
done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reason-
able measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof.89
The category of “superior” includes military persons in a military
chain of command; that is, military commanders.  One soldier shoot-
ing with one bullet at one civilian constitutes a deliberate attack on
civilians and is a punishable offense; but, if the soldier has been or-
dered to so act by a superior, the superior is also criminally responsi-
ble.
Although individual soldiers might be held liable for unlawful
deliberate attacks, the offenses related to such attacks would appear
to be oriented more towards a higher level decision.  Although it is
desirable to have direct evidence that an accused planned or decided
upon an attack, it is possible to establish a case based on circumstan-
tial evidence.  For example, if an accused is a military commander re-
sponsible for the soldiers manning a particular part of a confrontation
line and these soldiers engage in sustained and frequent unlawful at-
tacks, it is a reasonable inference that they were ordered to do so by
the commander.  In the alternative, circumstantial evidence might be
sufficient to establish knowledgeable acquiescence to such an extent
that a commander might be held liable under the doctrine of com-
mand responsibility as set forth in Article 7(1) and Article (3) of the
ICTY Statute.  Bearing in mind the unprecedented number of
knowledgeable intermediaries and interlopers such as peacekeepers
and others present in or near the confrontation line and the extent of
89. Id. at 38-39.
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world media coverage, it is reasonable to presume that it will be eas-
ier to establish that superiors knew of unlawful acts on the battlefield
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia than elsewhere.
Except in the most simple of cases, a first step in conducting an
investigation concerning unlawful attacks should be an attempt to
develop a general overview of the military situation, including, if pos-
sible, an indication of the relevant information available or readily
available to the potential accused.  An individual should not be
charged or convicted on the basis of hindsight but on the basis of in-
formation available to him or information he recklessly failed to ob-
tain at the time in question.90  The overview should include topogra-
phy, an indication of the forces and equipment available to each side,
their objectives and constraints, the size of the area attacked, the
number of civilians and the number and nature of civilian objects in
the area.  It should also include a brief review of the tactical doctrine
of the opposing forces, such as whether they tended to rely on over-
whelming firepower, or on mobility.
The tempo of military operations is a relevant factor in deter-
mining the legitimacy of particular attacks.  If ground forces are en-
gaged in wide ranging mobile operations in circumstances where de-
cisions to attack must be made frequently and quickly and on the
basis of very limited information, good faith errors can be made and
no criminal liability should attach.  Conversely, when armed forces
are engaged in operations in a relatively static situation, such as a
siege, or when there is relatively little fighting occurring, it is reason-
able to assume that decision-makers are able to devote more time
and effort to individual attack decisions.  The duration and intensity
of attacks is also relevant in determining culpability.  Unfortunately,
when attacks are massive and of substantial duration, it is often much
more difficult to determine whether or not particular aspects of the
attack are lawful.  If a city is being assaulted, for example, so much
may be happening that it is impossible to gather information con-
cerning where projectiles are landing because of the numbers of
shells and the physical danger involved in conducting an investiga-
tion.  Similarly, it may be extremely difficult to conduct a useful in-
vestigation after the event because it is not practicable to determine
precisely when and how particular incidents occurred.  This problem
is even more difficult to resolve when air operations are concerned:
The bombing of Dresden in 1945 cannot be reconstructed on an air-
90. See Hostages Trial, supra note 36, at 69.
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craft-by-aircraft or bomb-by-bomb basis.  One must attempt to make
a global assessment in such cases and focus on the total effect of an
attack.  An incident by incident analysis will only be practicable when
there are a relatively limited number of incidents and when the nec-
essary evidence can be gathered without placing the evidence gather-
ers in an excessively dangerous situation.
An assessment of the attacking force’s knowledge of the area
being attacked is also significant.  If the attacking force has a detailed
knowledge of the area because it has operated in the area for an ex-
tended period of time, or because it is located in positions which
overlook the area, or because many of its soldiers come from the
area, it is reasonable to presume it will have a better understanding
of which objects are military objectives than an attacking force which
has none of these advantages.
It is desirable to determine the weapons and tactics used by the
attacking force.  Every weapon system has a Circular Error Probable
(or CEP).  When a weapon system is targeted on a specific objective,
50 percent of the projectiles launched will land inside the CEP.  Ob-
viously, 50 percent will also land outside the CEP.  If weapons sys-
tems with large CEPs are directed against military objectives in
heavily populated areas, one might conclude that the real object of
attack is the civilian population, not the military objective.  On the
other hand, if one uses weapons which can be precisely aimed, such
as sniper rifles, or if the person controlling the weapon system can
see the target, for example a machine gunner, it is reasonable to con-
clude that what is hit is what is aimed at: If snipers kill children, it is
because they intend to do so.  Proof that certain tactics have been
used may establish or reinforce an assertion that an attack was delib-
erate.  If, for example, mortar shells are fired from mortars in fixed
emplacements aimed at certain specific areas, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the specific areas are intentionally hit.  Proof of the use of
cat-and-mouse tactics by snipers who allow some civilians to move
about unmolested so that others may be caught off guard can estab-
lish that their attacks are both wilful and sadistic.
Generally speaking, before concluding that an attack at a spe-
cific location is lawful or unlawful, one should identify the legitimate
military objectives in the vicinity of the attack and their importance,
the numbers of civilians and the types of civilian objects in the vicin-
ity of the attack, the ratio of military to civilian casualties, and the
scale of damage to military and civilian objects.  The number of pro-
jectiles used is also relevant.  Mistakes do occur and, on occasion,
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shells land in the wrong place.  If two or more shells land in the same
area, the probability of their having been aimed at the area increases
substantially.  In some circumstances it will be practicable to deter-
mine whether or not the attacking force incurred risks to limit the
danger to civilians.  Evidence of assumption of risk may mitigate or
even eliminate criminal responsibility.  Firing mortars or sniper rifles
at civilians would not appear to involve a substantial assumption of
risk.
The findings of the Trial Chamber in the Martic Rule 61 pro-
ceeding indicate how a court might assess evidence on this issue (the
reader should, however, bear in mind that Rule 61 proceedings are
uncontested):
28. As regards the attacks themselves, the testimony of Sergeant
Curtis, a member of the Office of the Prosecutor, and of the two
police officers from Zagreb shows that on the morning of 2 May
1995, three rockets struck the centre of the city of Zagreb while
three others hit a site near the civilian airport.  On 3 May 1995,
during the lunch hour, two rockets again fell on the centre of the
city and three others on nearby neighbourhoods.  Seven people
died in the two attacks, more than 100 were seriously wounded, and
an equal number were slightly wounded.  All the testimony cor-
roborates the assertion that none of these people were, or could be
presumed to have been, performing a military duty.
29. As the photographs and the video tape produced during the
hearing show, there was significant physical damage which could
have been much more serious.  It appears both from the documents
and the testimony heard that a high school, a children’s hospital, a
retirement home, and the National Academy were damaged.  Ac-
cording to the witnesses, there were no military targets in the im-
mediate vicinity.  It is noted, however, that the administration
building of the Ministry of the Interior was also allegedly hit during
the attack of 2 May.  In addition, the witnesses emphasised that
there were no military targets near the places where the civilians
were killed.  All asserted that the number of deaths might have
been much higher.  The fact that there were few civilians in the
streets of Zagreb during the second attack can be attributed to the
climate of terror generated by the attack of the previous day.  The
frightened population chose to desert the streets during the lunch
hour, which certainly reduced the number of casualties this type of
shelling might have caused.
30. . . . The military expert believed that because they are inaccu-
rate and have a low striking force, the choice of the Orkan rockets
for the attack on Zagreb would not have been appropriate had the
purpose been to damage military targets.  In respect of this, the ex-
pert referred to a set of photographs which show minor damage to
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buildings in Zagreb during the attacks of May 1995.  In this opinion,
it is therefore reasonable to believe that attacking and terrorising
the civilian population was the main reason for using such rockets.
Finally, the expert stated that the rockets were launched from a re-
gion for using such rockets.  Finally, the expert stated that the rock-
ets were launched from a region less than 50 kilometres from Za-
greb controlled by the armed forces of the self-proclaimed Republic
of Serbian Krajina.  The region presents the type of geophysical
conditions which lend themselves to this type of operation.
31. Based on the evidence produced and the testimony heard, the
Trial Chamber is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that on 2 and 3 May 1995, the civilian population of the city
of Zagreb was attacked with Orkan rockets on orders from Milan
Martic, the then president of the self-proclaimed Republic of Ser-
bian Krajina.91
IX. A CAUTIONARY NOTE - THE BATTLE OF MANILA
The battle to recapture Manila from the Japanese in 1945 is a
particularly painful example of an attempt to minimize civilian casu-
alties that went wrong for reasons beyond the control of the attacking
force.  In order to recapture the Philippines, it was necessary for
American forces to retake Manila.  The Japanese commander or-
dered his troops to evacuate the city on the approach of American
forces as he did not have sufficient forces to defend it nor did he have
enough food to feed the civilian population.  A subordinate disre-
garded the orders and directed his troops to fight to the death to de-
fend the city.  In the course of the battle, American forces sur-
rounded the city and closed in towards its center.  The Japanese
would not surrender.  Initially, American commanders imposed se-
vere restrictions on the use of artillery but, as American casualties
mounted, the restrictions were lifted.  The American official history
described the situation:
The losses had manifestly been too heavy for the gains achieved.  If
the city were to be secured without the destruction of the 37th and
the 1st Cavalry Divisions, no further effort could be made to save
the buildings; everything holding up progress would be pounded, al-
though artillery fire would not be directed against the structures
such as churches and hospitals that were known to contain civilians.
91. Martic, supra note 74.
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Even this last restriction would not always be effective for often it
could not be learned until too late that a specific building held ci-
vilians.  The lifting of the restrictions on support fires would result
in turning much of southern Manila into a shambles; but there was
no help for that if the city were to be secured in a reasonable length
of time and with reasonable losses.92
At one stage in the battle, concerned about mounting casualties,
American commanders once again requested permission to use dive-
bombing and napalm strikes against Japanese trapped in the Intra-
muros area of Manila.  General MacArthur, the American com-
mander, refused to lift the ban:
The use of air attacks on a part of a city occupied by a friendly and
allied population is unthinkable.  The inaccuracy of this type of
bombardment would result beyond question in the death of thou-
sands of innocent civilians.  It is not believed moreover that this
would appreciably lower our own casualty rate although it would
unquestionably hasten the conclusion of the operations.  For this
reason I do not approve the use of air bombardment on the Intra-
muros District.93
On some few occasions, the Japanese did release civilians who
were welcomed into American lines.94  Generally, the Japanese had
ignored the presence of the civilians or used them as hostages.  As
the Japanese situation became more hopeless, they began to commit
atrocities against the civilians.  An estimated 16,000 Japanese soldiers
died in the battle.95  One thousand Americans were killed and an-
other 5,000 were wounded.96  Manila was devastated and the bodies
of 100,000 Filipino civilians were found in the rubble, most of them
killed in the exchange of fire between American and Japanese
forces.97  Six Filipino civilians were dead for every soldier who had
been killed.
A review of the facts clearly indicates that American forces and
their commanders did not conduct an indiscriminate attack causing
excessive civilian casualties within the meaning of Protocol I.  It was
92. R. SMITH, TRIUMPH IN THE PHILIPPINES 264 (1963).
93. Id. at 294.
94. See id. at 299.
95. See id. at 306-307.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 237-308.
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impossible to predict the horrifying toll of civilian lives before the at-
tack began.  Indeed, the Japanese had been ordered to withdraw
from the city, but the orders had been disregarded.  Serious efforts
were made to minimize civilian casualties and American lives were
lost because of targeting restrictions.  It is always possible to argue
after the event that if American commanders had been prepared to
take more risks with the lives of their troops, more Filipino lives
would have been saved, but this argument ignores many of the reali-
ties of combat.  Objectively speaking, excessive civilian casualties oc-
curred during the battle for Manila, but it would be unrealistic and
quite unfair to impute legal or even moral responsibility for this to
the American commanders who directed the recapture of the city.
X. CONCLUSION
International humanitarian law is primarily designed as a body
of preventive law.  As such, it is intended to be incorporated in na-
tional military training and planning to reinforce and particularize
individual morality and, when hostilities occur, to reduce net human
suffering.  International humanitarian law is a second-level barrier,
used to contain violence once hostilities commence.  The legal rules
related to attacks on persons and objects must be drafted and inter-
preted in a manner which pays due heed to the grim admonition of
Henry Stimson, the United States Secretary of War during World
War II, that “the face of war is the face of death: death is an inevita-
ble part of every order that a wartime leader gives.”98  Simultane-
ously, however, international humanitarian law is and must be more
than a set of hortatory injunctions.  The fact that prosecution is diffi-
cult does not mean that prosecution is impossible.  It is possible to es-
tablish that some attacks are intended to terrorize the civilian popula-
tion or are deliberate attacks on civilian persons or objects.  It is
more difficult but it is also possible to establish that some attacks are
indiscriminate.  Indeed, the relatively slow pace and low intensity of
the ground fighting which has occurred in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since the beginning of 1991 should make it practicable to
conduct thorough investigations concerning alleged unlawful attacks.
One hopes and expects that the ICTY will then contribute to the de-
velopment of international humanitarian law by issuing sound deci-
sions which add specificity to the existing general rules.
98. Henry Stimson, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Feb.
1947, at 99, 106-07.
